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Payment-for-environmental-services (PES) programs are the focus of increasing 
attention globally. While existing PES programs can observe who participates and who 
does not, the reasons for nonparticipation can be opaque. Taking advantage of a unique 
stated preference data set that includes a follow-up question on conditions for 
participation, this study differentiates two types of non-participants, those deterred by 
insufficient payments, and those deterred by fundamental incompatibility with the farm 
operation. Survey weighted and spatially weighted probit models are applied to examine 
the determinants of farmers’ willingness to enroll in PES programs and their willingness 
to consider enrollment at the same or a high payment. Results suggest the decision to 
enroll relies more on farm benefit-cost factors, such as program payment, total land area 
and current farming practice, while the decision to consider enrolling depends more on 
farm and operator characteristics, such as environmental attitudes, soil traits, current 
government program enrollment or commitment to organic farming. Both decisions also 
show evidence of spatial dependence that suggest spill-over effects due to natural 
resources, interpersonal communication, or other socio-economic factors. These findings 
elucidate reasons for non-participation in PES programs and provide insights for future 
program design and targeting. 
 
Keywords:  Payment-for-environmental-services, agricultural policy, non-participation, 
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Agriculture is an ecosystem transformed by humans for establishing agricultural 
production. In addition to supplying food, fiber and fuel (known as provisioning services), 
agricultural lands can also provide non-marketed environmental services (ES) by 
farmers’ choice of production inputs and management practices, such as soil conservation 
from reduced tillage, and water quality improvement from less fertilizer application 
(Wossink and Swinton, 2007). However, many non-marketed ES benefit people beyond 
the farm gate, so farmers have little incentive to produce those services.  
Payment for environmental services (PES) policies are attracting increasing 
attention globally as a policy innovation that translates external ES values into financial 
incentives for local providers like farmers (Engel, et al., 2008). PES is formally defined 
as a voluntary transaction where a well-defined environmental service or a land use likely 
to secure that service is being ‘bought’ by a service buyer from a service provider if and 
only if the service provider secures service provision (Wunder, 2005). In the United 
States, the focus of federal agricultural PES has recently shifted from land retirement 
programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), to conservation on working 
lands--land used primarily for crop production and grazing (Cattaneo, et al., 2005). The 
850 million acres of working lands, which is equivalent to 45% of land area of the 48 
contiguous U.S. states, have a great potential to provide environmental services. 
Government spending in the four largest working land programs is projected to grow by 
85% between 2002-2007 and 2008-2012 to a total of $11.7 billion
1
                                                                 
1 Source: Briefing Rooms for Conservation Policy, Economic Research Service (ERS), United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
, largely allocated to 




Program (CSP). As the concentration of those programs has evolved from restricting 
local negative externalities, e.g., soil erosion and nitrate run-off, to providing public 
goods, like greenhouse gas mitigation and biodiversity, understanding how farmers 
respond to PES becomes imperative. 
Farmers’ participation in paid conservation programs has been examined by 
several studies. Zbinden and Lee (2005) have identified factors influencing farmer’ and 
forest owners’ participation in a Costa Rican PES program, in which three fixed levels of 
payment were provided for reforestation, forest conservation, and sustainable forest 
management activities respectively. Their results suggested that farm size, household 
economic factors, and information variables significantly influence the probability of 
participation in program alternatives. Lambert et al. (2006) have examined farms’ 
adoption of conservation practices/structures and participation in government 
conservation programs (CRP and EQIP) in the United States based on a USDA 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey from 2001 to 2003. They found that 
characteristics of the farm operator and household, in addition to the characteristics of the 
farm business, were associated with both the likelihood that a farmer will adopt certain 
conservation-compatible practices and the degree of participation in different types of 
conservation programs. Two studies also have analyzed farmers’ response to hypothetic 
conservation programs with varied levels of payment. Purvis et al. (1989) studied 
farmers’ willingness to participate in a filter strip program, and showed that their 
decisions are determined by the yearly payment, perceptions of environmental change, 
and farm opportunity costs. Jolejole et al. (2009) examined farmers’ participation and 
land acreage enrollment in four environmental stewardship programs. Results suggested  
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farmers’ perception of environmental performance, payment offers and total land area are 
influential. 
Those previous studies have commonly examined whether farmers participate in 
PES programs and the degree of participation measured by enrollment acreage or number 
of practices. However, underlying reasons for non-participation still remain opaque. For 
example, some farmers would not enroll in the PES program for inherent reasons 
regardless of the payment offer, while other non-participants would change their mind 
with a higher payment. Those types of nonparticipation are difficult to observe by 
farmers’ response at a given payment level. Taking advantage of a unique stated 
preference data set that includes a follow-up question on conditions for participation, this 
study separates non-participants who would consider enrolling in the program at a higher 
payment from those who would not participate even at a high payment level. By 
diagnosing farmers’ reasons for non-participation, this study will inform PES program 
design about the difference between non-enrollees who are close to enrolling and those 
who are not. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the conceptual 
formulation of farmer enrollment and consideration decisions; section 3 proposes the 
study objectives and hypotheses stemming from the conceptual model; section 4 
describes the survey data; section 5 introduces the econometric model for enrollment and 
consideration associated with regression variables; section 6 presents and interprets the 





2. Conceptual model 
Farmer decisions about participation in PES programs can be viewed as an 
attempt to maximize their utility subject to resource constraints. Profit maximization is 
often assumed for farmer’s adoption of conservation practices or enrollment in programs. 
However, this assumption fails to recognize heterogeneity among farmers’ preferences 
(Nowak, 1987) and does not explain why certain profitable practices are not adopted 
(Neill and Lee, 2001). Therefore, more general studies assume that farmers make the 
decision from utility maximization rather than profit (Rahm and Huffman, 1984). While 
the net returns from programs or practices are included in the utility function, other 
objectives are also considered, such as environmental quality and social benefit. One 
important class of constraint to adoption of new technology is access to information.  
Research into the diffusion of new technologies points to the importance of interpersonal 
communication, including a strong spatial element (Rogers, 1983). 
The conceptual framework of this paper is built on a constrained utility 
maximization model, as shown in Equation (1). The utility of a farmer is assumed to 
increase in consumption of marketed goods (Z) and nonmarketed environmental services 
(E). A budget constrains the cost of consumption not to exceed profits from farm 
production (π) plus nonfarm income (NFI), which includes any incentive payment (P*) if 
the farmer enrolls in a PES program. Farm profit (π) is earned from selling agricultural 
products (Y) at price py minus variable cost (pxX) and fixed cost (FC). Output Y is a 
function of managed inputs X, fixed factors (FC) and unmanaged environmental services 
(E). The variable cost refers to material and hired labor, while fixed cost depends on 
family labor (L), capital (K), land acreage (A), biophysical conditions (B) and 
information (I) available to farmers. Farmers maximize utility by choosing variable  
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seasonal inputs X (e.g., fertilizer, seed, hired labor), given fixed capital and family labor. 
The environmental services (E) may affect both outputs and inputs of farm production. 
Spatial neighborhood effects stemming from interpersonal communication, natural and 
social conditions (e.g., weather, topography, markets and policies), have possible 
influence on all factors in the model.  
 
        (1)
 
        s.t.  ( ) * Z NFI P π ≤+        (2) 
    ( ) ( ) |,,,, ,,,, yx pY X LKBAI pX F C LKBAI π =−−     (3) 
Farmer decisions on participating in PES programs depend on the change of utility 
after enrollment. Farmers would enroll acreage in a PES program only if the change of 
utility associated with specific program payment P* is greater than zero (ΔU (P
*) > 0). 
Among those who opt not to enroll, those who would consider enrolling only if the 
change of utility associated with their perceived maximum politically feasible payment 
P
high is greater than zero (ΔU (P
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Utility change levels in response to adoption of changed production practices for 
some payment are unique to individual decision makers in specific settings. Figure 1 
illustrates four indicative utility gain (ΔU) curves from a given set of production practices 
( ) ,
X MaxU Z E 
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in response to PES payment level (P). At the program payment level P*, the changed 
utilities are greater than zero for farmer 1 and 2 (ΔU
1 (P*)>0, ΔU
2 (P*)>0), who would 
choose to enroll. Notably, farmer 1 has positive utility gain from the proposed production 
practices and would adopt the practices even without payment (ΔU
1 (0)>0). Farmer 2 is 
willing to adopt the practices with incentive payment P*. In contrast, farmers who choose 
not to enroll at a given payment may have one of two types of reasons. First, some who 
face higher costs of adoption may be deterred from enrolling in the program by 
insufficient payment, but would consider doing so with a higher but still politically 
feasible payment. The third utility gain curve represents this case (ΔU
3 (P*) <0, ΔU
3 
(P
high) > 0). On the other hand, fundamental incompatibility may deter some others who 
have unfavorable physical settings, unacceptably high adjustment cost, negative attitudes 
toward the proposed practices, or unsuitable management skills. Those farmers are 
unlikely to consider the program at any likely payment offer, represented by farmer 4 in 
the figure (P (ΔU
4=0) >> P
high). Each farmer perceives a uniquely different change in 
utility for a given combination of changed production practices.  Likewise, each farmer 
will have a different perception of the maximum feasible payment that determines 
whether they believe that conditions exist for a higher payment that they might be willing 
to accept.  This study aims to expand our understanding of nonparticipation in PES 
programs by distinguishing between the motives of those willing to consider enrolling at 
a higher payment perceived as feasible (case 3 above) and those unwilling to consider 




3. Objectives and hypotheses 
Using farmer survey data from Michigan, this study aims to: 1) differentiate non-
participants into “consider” and “not consider” groups, and investigate determinants of 
these two types of non-enrollment; 2) examine determinants of a conventional model that 
differentiates “enroll” from “not enroll” groups; 3) compare similarities and differences 
of the two decisions and use farmers’ qualitative statements to support econometric 
results; and 4) analyze neighborhood spatial effects on farmer’s enrollment and 
consideration decisions using on ZIP code level data. 
Two hypotheses are to be tested in this study: 
1) Same underlying factors determine the enrollment decision and consideration 
decision; 
 2) No neighborhood effects exist in the enrollment and consideration decisions. 
 
4. Data 
Data for this study come from a 2008 mail survey of Michigan corn and soybean 
farmers that yielded 1688 responses (56% response rate). All farms in the sample were 
randomly drawn from four strata with 0 to 100, 101 to 500, 501 to 1000 and 1000 and 
more acres respectively to ensure that the farmer population is well represented. Each 
respondent was presented with four hypothetical cropping systems that differed in their 
management complexity and provided different levels of soil conservation, water quality 
and greenhouse gas mitigation services (Table 1). System A, the base system, was a corn-
soybean rotation with chisel-tillage and university fertilizer recommendations based on 
soil testing. System B added a winter cover crop, system C added wheat to the crop  
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rotation, and system D added a requirement to band fertilizer application over the crop 
row and reduce rates by one third below university recommendations. For each cropping 
system, respondents were offered a specific payment if they would adopt the system for a 
period of five years, and they were asked how many acres they would enroll in such a 
program. Farmers who would “enroll” or “not enroll” were distinguished by this question. 
Respondents who chose not to enroll any land were asked whether they would consider 
enrolling in that system if the payment were higher. Farmers who “consider but not 
enroll” in the program and those who would “not consider” were further differentiated. 
See Figure 2 for differentiation of those groups, and Figure 3 for the number of farms 
falling into different groups for each cropping system proposed. Average payment levels 
were higher for systems with more management complexity (Figure 3 does not take the 
differing payment levels into account). Respondents received different versions of the 
questionnaire with experimentally designed variation in the payment levels and 
sequencing. Some respondents faced a sequence of increasing complexity of systems 
with nondecreasing payment offers, while others faced the opposite sequence. In the 
survey, farmers were invited to write down the reasons for their choices. Detailed 
information about data collection and questionnaire design can be found in Jolejole 
(2009). 
 
5. Econometric model and variables 
  To model the participation in PES programs, several functional forms have been 
used in the literature. Since the basic participation decision is a dichotomous choice, 
binary response models such as probit and logit have often been used (Zbinden and Lee, 
2005, Lambert et al., 2006, Jolejole et al., 2009). Multinomial logit was also applied for  
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best choice among program alternatives (Zbinden and Lee, 2005, Lambert et al., 2006). 
The degree of participation such as land enrollment proportion (Purvis et al., 1989), 
enrollment acreage (Jolejole et al., 2009) and number of practice (Lambert et al., 2006), 
were also analyzed using tobit, truncated regression  and negative binominal models 
respectively.  
Farmers’ participation responses at the two decision levels are “yes” or “no” 
choices. Thus, a probit binary response model is used to estimate factors affecting 
enrollment choice (enrollment model) and two types of non-enrollment choice 
(consideration model). The probit model in Equation (4)-(6) builds on the random utility 
framework (McFadden, 1974), where y is the binary dependent variable indicating 
farmers’ enrollment or consideration in the two models respectively. y* is a latent 
variable measuring farmers’ utility from their choice. X is a vector of explanatory 
variables influencing the utility. The error term ε is assumed to have a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance σ
2. As farms are divided into four strata with different 
percentages being sampled, the estimates for both probit models are weighted by the 











     (4) 
* yX βε = +  
2 ~ (0, ) N εσ     (5) 







   
(6) 
We also test the spatial dependence among those responses, which may come 
from interpersonal communication, natural and social factors. Spatial dependence is 
formally defined as “the existence of a functional relationship between what happens at  
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one point in space and what happens elsewhere” (Anselin, 1988). The spatial weighting 
matrix (W) is used to model spatial relationships based on the ZIP code level spatial data 
(Figure 4). Each element of the weighting matrix (wij) measures the inverse distance 
between the centroids of ZIP code areas i and j. The basic assumption is that farms 
located in the same ZIP code area are highly affected by unobserved neighborhood 
natural and socio-economic factors, while farms in ZIP code areas within 25 kilometers 
are also related at levels that decay with distance. 
In expanding the binary choice decision to accommodate spatial dependence, the 
spatial probit incorporates spatial structure into the specification of y* as in Equation (7)-















* y IWX ρ βε
−
= −+       (8) 
2
12 ~ (0, ) ( , ,..., ) n N V V diag v v v εσ =   (9) 
This model is similar to the non-spatial probit model in Equation (4)-(6) except 
for building in spatial effect and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. ρ denotes the 
spatial autoregressive parameter that measures the spatial lag of the latent variable 
estimate compared with a non-spatial model. I is the unit diagonal identity matrix. W 
denotes the spatial weighting matrix constructed on inverse distance between ZIP codes
2
                                                                 
2 Centroid for each zip code area is firstly constructed. Farms in a zip code are assumed to be correlated with 
farms in nearby zip code areas within a radius of 25000 meters from centroid. Different farms in each zip code 
are assigned a higher weight, the inverse of 6500 meters (the radius of median ZIP code area).  
. 
As heteroskedasticity (represented by V) is often present in spatial models of probit  
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estimation, a Bayesian spatial probit estimation with Gibbs sampler is used to analyze the 
spatial effects (LeSage, 1999)
3
To test whether the same set of determinants underpin both enrollment decisions 
and consideration decisions, two weighted probit models are estimated. The dependent 
variable for enrollment model is farmers’ choice of enrollment or not, whereas the 
dependent variable for consideration model is farmers’ choice to consider but not enroll 
or not consider. The dependent variable for spatial probit model is binary choice of 
enrollment or consideration respectively. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics of 
dependent variables. 
. 
Five broad categories of explanatory variables linked to the conceptual model are 
defined as follows (Table 4). First, questionnaire version category, corresponding to 
program payment P*, includes the level of payment provided with each cropping system, 
the sequence of payment level and whether the payment is provided by government. The 
payment is the direct benefit or cost saving from enrolling in the program. The adoption 
of changed cropping practices is assumed to cause farmers to incur additional direct costs 
(e.g., for labor and/or material inputs) and opportunity costs (e.g., for growing a less 
profitable crop). Based on results from farmer focus groups in 2007, the payment offer 
ranges for the four cropping systems were: A: $4 to $17; B: $10 to $36; C: $15 to $55; 
and D: $20 to $75.  The payment offer is assumed to have more effect for enrollment 
decision than consideration decision. The descending sequence variable is a dummy 
variable denotes increasing/decreasing sequence of cropping system complexity and 
                                                                 
3 Since the Bayesian spatial probit estimation does not apply to a weighted model, spatial effect is only examined 
in unweighted stratum-level models. Due to limited data in each stratum, fewer variables are used as regressors.  
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payment level. Previous studies suggest that it is ideal for this sequencing variable to 
have no effect on participation decision. 
Second, the perception and attributes category of variables, corresponding to 
environmental services E, depicts farmers’ perception of ES benefit from certain 
cropping systems and their attitudes on whether nature provides services that could 
benefit their production. These variables are measured through a series of 5 point Likert 
scale questions (1 for strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for neutral, 4 for agree and 5 for 
strongly agree). Past studies have shown that farmers’ positive perception (D'Emden, et 
al., 2008, Gould, et al., 1989, Sidibe, 2005, Traore, et al., 1998, Wei, et al., 2009) and 
attitudes (Lynne, et al., 1988, Sheikh, et al., 2003) tended to promote enrollment in 
conservation programs. 
The third category describes the biophysical attributes of farms corresponding to 
biophysical conditions B, which includes farm size and soil types. Farm size is expected 
to have positive effect since larger farms have a higher capacity to invest and to 
withstand risks from changed practices (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007, Prokopy, et al., 
2008). Soil type refers to dummy variables for soil texture. Clay soils may be more fertile 
but less well-drained than the loam soil baseline, whereas sandy soils are less fertile but 
better drained due to looser particles. Soil attributes exhibited mixed effect in different 
studies depending on the specific practices. In this study, enrollment in a system with less 
use of chemicals is expected to be positively related to clay soil which is classified to be 
more fertile than sandy soil and silty soil, while the use of cover crops over winter is 
expected to be positively related to sandy soil (Jolejole, et al., 2009).   
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The fourth category measures farm management attributes, corresponding to 
variable input X, labor L and capital K. The current practices of tillage, wheat acreage, 
cover crops, irrigation, organic crops, pre-sidedress nitrate test (PSNT), fertilizer and 
pesticides
4 are expected to have a positive effect on participation if they are similar to the 
proposed cropping system. Irrigation of farmland has mixed influence on adoption of 
new practices. It facilitates the adoption of PSNT
5, but prevents reduced tillage and crop 
rotation
6
The fifth category is operator attributes, including age and level of formal 
education of farm operators, which may influence farmers’ information I and choice of 
practice X, L and K. Most studies found education can improve farmers’ acceptance of 
new practice, and hence increase the probability of participation (Prokopy, et al., 2008). 
Studies also found that older farmers were reluctant to change their current practices 
(Bosch, et al., 1995, Rahm and Huffman, 1984, Wu and Babcock, 1998). 
 (Bosch, et al., 1995, Wu and Babcock, 1998). These results depend on the 
payoff of irrigation associated with different practices. Various studies suggested that 
when farmers were involved in a conservation program they were more likely to 
participate since they had more information on those practices and shared costs (Bosch, et 
al., 1995, Ervin and Ervin, 1982, Wei, et al., 2009, Wu and Babcock, 1998).  
6. Results 
Our results reject the hypothesis that the enrollment decision and consideration 
decision are determined by same factors. The enrollment decision is found to rely more 
on program benefit-cost criteria, while the consideration decision depends more on farm 
                                                                 
4 Reduced fertilizer and pesticides are dummy variables with one indicating currently band apply 
fertilizer/pesticide to 2/3 of full field rate. 
5 Irrigated farms tend to use more fertilizer, while the PSNT helps them to reasonably reduce the application. 
6 Crop residues resulting from reduced tillage interfere with irrigation; crop rotation reduces the payoff from 
irrigation by growing less water-intensive but high-valuable crops.  
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and operator characteristics. Table 5 and Table 6 show the coefficient estimates from 
weighted probit regressions. Farmers’ comments on participation choices are also 
incorporated to inform the interpretation of regression results. 
Two common factors underpin both consideration and enrollment decisions. First, 
the perceived environmental performance of each system significantly contributes to both 
enrollment and willingness to consider each of the four cropping systems. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies, as the perceived ES benefits both individual farmers and 
the society. Feedback from surveyed farmers about reasons to enroll or not enroll in the 
program reveal more care about individual benefits, such as soil fertility, than social 
benefits like global warming mitigation
7
Second, the similarity of current farming management and technologies to the 
proposed cropping system also increases willingness to participate and consider the 
program due to lower risk and less extra cost. Willingness to add wheat to the corn-
soybean crop rotation is a case in point. In the words of respondent R2525, who enrolled, 
“We already use a corn soy wheat rotation like this.”  In the models for system C and D 
that add wheat into the crop rotation, a higher proportion of land previously in wheat 
significantly increases the probability of both consideration and enrollment. The 
influence of the wheat area proportion on enrollment is significant at 1% level, while it is 
only significant in the consideration model at 10% level. From farmers’ comments, we 
learn that those who decline to enroll in the program for systems C and D but would 
consider doing so for a higher payment plant less wheat acreage or find wheat to be less 
. 
                                                                 
7 “Better crop yield and conservation farming, not waste of fertilizer and pesticides” (R0401, enroll) 
“Increase in organic matter and soil conservation” (R1732, enroll)  
“Global warming is a crock but carbon is good for yields” (R608, enroll) 
“Technology gains for products and environment” (R587, consider but not enroll) 





8.  Those who will not even consider enrolling are often restricted by 
incompatibility with other farm operations
9
Five benefit-cost characteristics distinguish respondents who chose to enroll in the 
program compared with those who chose not to enroll. First and foremost, the per-acre 
payment offer for each system significantly encourages enrollment (Table 5). The 
payment variable has a positive effect for all systems in the enrollment model, whereas it 
negatively influences the consideration decision for system B and C (Table 6). Some 
farmers who choose to enroll or consider the programs are attracted by the program 
payment offer or a possible higher payment, while farmers who would not even consider 




Second, the decreasing sequence of cropping system complexity and associated 
payment levels reduces enrollment in all but the most complex system.  This unexpected 
effect suggests psychological anchoring by respondents who become disinclined to enroll 
for lower payments, despite the simpler systems.  By contrast, decreasing cropping 
system complexity promotes willingness to consider the program in the two most 
complex systems.  
. 
                                                                 
8 “Wheat rotation is too high of a percentage for me” (R2513, consider but not enroll) 
“Wheat is less profitable, don’t want to cultivate” (R206, consider but not enroll) 
 
9 “We do not have time to harvest wheat” (R604, not consider) 
“We don’t grow wheat because we feed beef steers and need corn for feed” (R1034, not consider) 
 
10 “Good stewardship of land. The 75/acre would help with the cost of soil nitrate testing along with establishing 
cover crops.” (R549, enroll) 
“It follows my system fairly closely 36 is an incentive if the system works.” (R689, enroll) 
 “Not enough money to be in a fixed program.  I like to be able to change.” (R1504, consider but not enroll) 
“$39 doesn’t cover cost of seed and planting cover crop.” (R501, consider but not enroll) 
“Yield reduction of spring tillage on heavy clay soils would require a 350 per acre payment.” (R1014, consider 




Third, farms with greater total cropland area are more likely to enroll in the 
program.  Large farms have the flexibility to enroll without committing all of their 
available land and can spread any fixed costs of adoption over more output. 
11
Fourth, the percentage of moldboard-tilled land has a negative effect on 
enrollment but no effect on consideration decision in any system, presumably due to the 
fixed cost of converting to a chisel plow, which is required by all four systems. Farmers 
may consider the program if that cost can be compensated by a higher payment, 
otherwise they would not consider
  Some 
smaller operators weighed the benefits of the per-acre payment against the fixed 
transaction costs of enrolling.  Said respondent R274, who has 320 acres and did not 
enroll but would consider it at a higher payment, “not enough acres to put up with the 
paper work.”  For the smallest farms, the cost of changing equipment often outweighed 
the total value of program benefits.  A case in point was respondent R0011, who has 8 
acres and would not consider enrolling, whose terse comment stated, “cost of equipment 
on very limited acreage.” 
12
Last, farmers who have already band applied fertilizer were more inclined to 
enroll in system D, which requires band fertilizer at 2/3 of university recommendation 
rate. Farmers who choose not to enroll are commonly restricted by equipment availability 
or undesired effects from banding
. 
13
                                                                 
11 “Steady income for 1/2 my acres could still continue no till practices on other 1/2” (R2947, enroll, 929 acres) 
. Respondents who band apply fertilizer were more 
likely to enroll in system D due to consistency with current practice. However, results 
12 “Just because we still chisel some acres” (R2629, enroll) 
“Higher cost and investment in machinery” (R164, consider but not enroll) 
 “I have the best crops with moldboard plow.” (R9, not consider) 
 
13 “We don’t have equipment for band apply fertilizer” (R95, not consider in D) 
“We got away from banding fertilizer years ago. It makes the corn plant lazy and without root system it tends to 




also suggest that for systems A, B, and C some of those farmers would consider 
converting back from banding to broadcasting fertilizer, if a higher payment were 
provided
14
Among respondents who opted not to enroll in the program, those who would 
consider enrolling are motivated by attitudinal, demographic and resource quality factors.  
. 
Farmers who believe their production can benefit from nature are more likely to 
consider enrolling in the program. Their attitudes would further enhance participation 
when combined with perceived positive environmental services. This is observed from 
farmers’ Likert ratio answers related to the links between agriculture and the environment. 
Younger farmers and those with more education are also more apt to consider the 
program. Presumably young farmers have enough time to try new practices and would be 
more open to new ideas
15
In terms of biophysical resources, respondents whose farms have less fertile sandy 
soils or poorly drained clay soil are less likely to consider system A that requires corn-
soybean rotation and chisel plow tillage
. 
16
Respondents with a high proportion of land committed to organic farming are also 
less likely to consider any of the four systems. Changing away from organic production 
. 
                                                                 
14 “I already band all my fertilizer.” (R608, enroll in D) 
“We already band fertilizer and use less than MSU recommendations. More fuel, more labor, less conservation.” 
(R2958, consider but not enroll in B) 
 “I like applying stacked bands of fertilizer (R2363, consider but not enroll in C) 
15 “I would enroll if I were younger. I am too old to enroll in 5-year program.” (R1209, not consider) 
“I don’t have the machinery. I’m too old to purchase new.” (R627, not consider) 
 
16 “Soil too sandy for soybean rotation” (R1157, not consider) 
“My soil is sand and rolling. I only plant enough corn to feed the cattle and enough soybeans to pay input costs 
and the rest is alfalfa.” (R1237, not consider) 





would impose a substantial adjustment cost and would also likely run counter to organic 
farmers’ environmental attitudes
17
Moreover, farmers who have participated in CRP, which provides both financial 
and technical assistance for adopting a wide range of conservation practices on both 
retired land and working land, showed higher interests in the programs proposed. 
. 
The second hypothesis that no neighborhood effects influence farmers’ 
participation decisions is also rejected. The spatial probit estimation suggests that positive 
neighborhood effects influence both participation and consideration decisions among 
farms.  However, correcting for spatial structure only leads to a minor change in the 
magnitudes of coefficient estimates. See Table 7 for spatial versus non-spatial 
comparison of coefficients and significance for enrollment model of system D. 
Significant spatial autoregressive parameter ρ in all four systems for both consideration 
and enrollment decisions can be seen in Table 8. Although spatial effects are generally 





In sum, this paper complements the literature on farmer participation in payment-
for-environmental-services programs by distinguishing two variants of program non-
                                                                 
17 “Farm in organic program” (R2019, not consider) 
 “Because I would like to go to organic I don’t agree with fertilizer and pesticide and spray.” (R2512, not 
consider) 
 
18 “In my location in northern Michigan, corn has not been a viable cash crop even high moisture corn for local 
dairy farms is only profitable for soil building values” (R840, not enroll) 
“Wheat delivery and acceptance at local elevations would need to get significantly more farmer friendly” (R1117, 
not enroll) 
“Wheat does not grow well in Kalamazoo county” (R2242, not enroll) 
“Compliance must be 100% through your community or noncompliance farmers would have a tremendous 




participation. It separates the enrollment decision from a decision among non-enrollees 
about whether they would be willing to consider enrolling at a higher payment. The 
decision to enroll relies more on farm benefit-cost factors, such as program payment, 
total land area and current farming practice.  By contrast, the decision to consider 
enrolling depends more on farm and operator characteristics, such as environmental 
attitudes, soil traits, current government program enrollment or commitment to organic 
farming.  Both decisions show evidence of spatial dependence that suggest spill-over 
effects due to natural resources, interpersonal communication, or other socio-economic 
factors. 
The characteristics that differentiate the consideration decision from enrollment 
decision can provide better insights for PES program targeting and design. As revealed 
by the consideration model, PES programs that propose farming practices that 
significantly conflict with farm operations or farmer’s characteristics are unlikely to be 
adopted even if a large payment were offered. Thus, PES programs that aim to be 
effectively adopted may directly target young, well educated farmers who are favorably 
disposed toward environmental stewardship but not committed to practices that are 
inconsistent with those proposed.  
The enrollment model also suggests ways to expand participation rates by 
program design. Farm cropping systems vary considerably, including crop rotation, 
tillage, fertilizer and pesticide application. The divergence in any aspects between current 
cropping system and the proposed one may pose benefit-cost barriers to enrollment in 
PES programs. Thus, a flexible program that is separable in practices associated with 
different payment levels may facilitate a higher participation rate.  A flexible program  
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will also be more adaptable to heterogeneous land and management skills.  Finally, 
research and outreach that build farmer understanding of environmental services from 
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Figure 1 Illustration of 4 farmers’ change in utility from adopting specified production 
practices as a function of the associated PES payment. 
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Figure 3 Number of farms participated in four cropping systems, 1688 Michigan corn and 










Table 1 Four cropping systems 
   A  B  C  D 
 Rotation     Corn-Soybean     Corn-Soybean     Corn-Soybean-
Wheat   
 Corn-Soybean-
Wheat   
 Cover 
Crops     None     Any type present 
over winter   
 Any type present 
over winter   
 Any type present 
over winter   
 Tillage   
 Chisel plow with 
cultivation as 
needed   
 Chisel plow with 
cultivation as 
needed   
 Chisel plow with 
cultivation as 
needed   
 Chisel plow with 
cultivation as 
needed   
    Pre-sidedress 
Nitrate Test   
 Pre-sidedress 
Nitrate Test   
 Pre-sidedress 
Nitrate Test   
 Pre-sidedress 
Nitrate Test   
 Soil Test     PSNT  PSNT   PSNT   PSNT  
 
Fertilization   
 Broadcast 
fertilizers at full 
MSU rates and split 
Nitrogen based on 
PSNT   
 Broadcast 
fertilizers at full 
MSU rates and split 
Nitrogen based on 
PSNT   
 Broadcast 
fertilizers at full 
MSU rates and split 
Nitrogen based on 
PSNT   
 Band apply over 
row at MSU rates 
and split Nitrogen 
based on PSNT   
 Pesticide 
Rate   
 Broadcast 
pesticides at a 
label rate   
 Broadcast 
pesticides at a 
label rate   
 Broadcast 
pesticides at a 
label rate   
 Band apply 
pesticides over 
row at a label 





Table 2 Sample weights for probit models 










      (ni)  (si)  (ni/N)  (si/S) 
1  0-100  9849  301  0.5585  0.1003 
2  101-500  5545  1050  0.3144  0.35 
3  501-1000  1361  770  0.0772  0.2567 
4  1000+  879  879  0.0498  0.293 




Table 3 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables 
Dependent Variable  system  unit  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
               
Probit model: enrollment               
Enroll VS Not enroll  A  binary  1265  0.253  0.435  0  1 
Enroll VS Not enroll  B  binary  1238  0.305  0.460  0  1 
Enroll VS Not enroll  C  binary  1223  0.387  0.487  0  1 
Enroll VS Not enroll  D  binary  1274  0.389  0.488  0  1 
               
Probit model: consideration               
Consider but not enroll VS Not consider  A  binary  826  0.409  0.492  0  1 
Consider but not enroll VS Not consider  B  binary  748  0.388  0.488  0  1 
Consider but not enroll VS Not consider  C  binary  639  0.382  0.486  0  1 
Consider but not enroll VS Not consider  D  binary  653  0.314  0.464  0  1 
 
* Note that the average prices in the experimental design increase as one moves from system A 




Table 4 Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Independent Variables  Units  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
    Questionnaire Version             
Government  binary  1796  0.497  0.500  0  1 
Descending sequence  binary  1796  0.503  0.500  0  1 
Payment offer (system A)  dollars  1796  10.214  4.775  4  17 
Payment offer (system B)  dollars  1796  23.243  9.045  10  36 
Payment offer (system C)  dollars  1796  36.683  12.465  15  55 
Payment offer (system D)  dollars  1796  50.960  16.703  20  75 
    Perception and attitudes             
Perceived env performance (A)  Likert 1-5  1245  2.965  0.808  1  5 
Perceived env performance (B)  Likert 1-5  1189  3.236  0.776  1  5 
Perceived env performance (C)  Likert 1-5  1200  3.372  0.784  1  5 
Perceived env performance (D)  Likert 1-5  1245  3.460  0.794  1  5 
Attitudes towards ES  Likert 1-5  1475  3.119  1.114  1  5 
    Farm biophysical attributes              
Total land  acres  1521  1151.135  1408.233  2  21500 
Sandy soil  binary  1796  0.274  0.446  0  1 
Clay soil  binary  1796  0.434  0.496  0  1 
    Farm attributes             
Moldboard tillage land percent  %  1486  0.067  0.178  0  1 
No till tillage land percent  %  1486  0.185  0.244  0  1 
Conservation land percent  %  1486  0.342  0.286  0  1 
Wheat land percent  %  1486  0.083  0.103  0  0.714 
Cover crops land percent  %  1489  0.047  0.149  0  1 
PSNT land percent  %  1489  0.050  0.170  0  1 
Organic land percent  %  1489  0.010  0.093  0  1 
Irrigation land percent  %  1796  0.048  0.165  0  1 
Reduced Fertilizer use  binary  1444  0.218  0.413  0  1 
Reduced Pesticide use  binary  1442  0.209  0.407  0  1 
MAEAP  binary  1371  0.142  0.349  0  1 
EQIP  binary  1379  0.298  0.458  0  1 
CRP  binary  1421  0.349  0.477  0  1 
CSP  binary  1324  0.120  0.325  0  1 
Enrollment in any program  binary  1499  0.841  1.004  0  4 
    Operator attributes             
Age  years  1501  54.780  11.631  21  94 
Education  years  1488  13.440  2.562  6  20 




Table 5  Consideration decision in the PES programs, weighted by stratum, by cropping 
systems, 1688 Michigan corn or soybean farmers, 2008 
 
   system A     system B     system C     system D    
   coef  p     coef  p     coef  p     coef  p    
    Questionnaire Version                       
Government  -0.039  0.835    0.170  0.410    0.044  0.837    -0.357  0.094  * 
Descending sequence  -0.099  0.614    -0.044  0.845    0.555  0.008  ***  0.352  0.097  * 
Payment offer   0.022  0.347    -0.022  0.037  **  -0.016  0.070  *  -0.005  0.377   
    Perception and attitudes                     
Perceived env perf  0.209  0.100  *  0.374  0.006  ***  0.367  0.011  **  0.269  0.033  ** 
Attitudes towards ES  0.212  0.033  **  0.213  0.040  **  0.331  0.000  ***  0.250  0.003  *** 
    Farm biophysical attributes                      
Total land  0.000  0.559    0.000  0.726    0.000  0.677    0.000  0.794   
Sandy soil  -0.611  0.050  **  -0.360  0.288    -0.209  0.486    0.032  0.931   
Clay soil  -0.530  0.065  *  -0.252  0.416    0.144  0.596    0.002  0.997   
    Farm management attributes                     
Moldboard tillage land percent  -0.702  0.221    -0.825  0.186    -0.776  0.171    -0.680  0.212   
No till tillage land percent  0.388  0.414    0.737  0.145    0.268  0.644    0.685  0.294   
Conservation land percent  -0.771  0.047  **  -0.522  0.190    -0.646  0.095  *  -0.715  0.062  * 
Wheat land percent  0.985  0.247    0.199  0.849    1.781  0.059  *  1.794  0.066  * 
Cover crops land percent  0.182  0.720    -0.671  0.182    -0.485  0.421    0.525  0.461   
PSNT land percent  -0.510  0.300    0.022  0.969    0.016  0.980    -0.551  0.280   
Organic land percent  -2.090  0.000  ***  -1.228  0.010  ***  -1.580  0.044  **  -1.790  0.010  *** 
Irrigation land percent  0.286  0.579    0.300  0.581    1.186  0.062  *  0.066  0.910   
Reduced Fertilizer use  0.522  0.047  **  0.574  0.027  **  0.612  0.061  *  0.192  0.507   
Reduced Pesticide use  0.061  0.792    -0.010  0.967    -0.003  0.992    0.321  0.292   
MAEAP  -0.438  0.154    -0.148  0.593    -0.513  0.112    -0.843  0.007  *** 
EQIP  -0.205  0.374    -0.192  0.462    0.145  0.605    -0.417  0.092  * 
CRP  0.304  0.180    0.443  0.080  *  0.552  0.061  *  0.540  0.100  * 
CSP  -0.510  0.086  *  -0.676  0.033  **  -0.510  0.162    -0.408  0.261   
    Operator attributes                       
Age  -0.012  0.184    -0.008  0.361    -0.021  0.026  **  -0.023  0.031  ** 
Education  0.122  0.001  ***  0.029  0.452    0.109  0.005  ***  0.060  0.200   
Constant  -2.151  0.028  **  -1.306  0.272     -2.840  0.006  ***  -1.498  0.291   
                          
N  595      540      454      468     
Wald chi  73.12      78.12      70.82      73.69     
p(chi)  0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00     
R square  0.20      0.18      0.22      0.20     
Loglikelihood  -310.85        -289.72        -213.31        -212.20       
 
Note: ***significant at 99% level, **significant at 95% level, *significant at 90% level 
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Table 6 Enrollment decision in the PES programs, weighted by stratum, by cropping systems, 
1688 Michigan corn or soybean farmers, 2008 
   system A     system B     system C     system D    
   coef  p     coef  p     coef  p     coef  p    
    Questionnaire Version                     
Government  -0.148  0.412    0.020  0.905    0.318  0.055  *  0.040  0.805   
Descending sequence  -0.314  0.104    -0.337  0.049  **  -0.487  0.004  ***  0.000  0.999   
Payment offer   0.041  0.024  **  0.034  0.000  ***  0.016  0.012  **  0.009  0.064  * 
    Perception and attitudes                     
Perceived env perf  0.403  0.002  ***  0.296  0.017  **  0.525  0.000  ***  0.814  0.000  *** 
Attitudes towards ES  -0.001  0.989    0.086  0.197    0.127  0.104    0.161  0.024  ** 
    Farm biophysical attributes                    
Total land  0.000  0.021  **  0.000  0.010  ***  0.000  0.075  **  0.000  0.210   
Sandy soil  0.110  0.678    -0.048  0.862    0.026  0.916    0.019  0.939   
Clay soil  -0.111  0.644    -0.190  0.443    -0.130  0.562    0.279  0.211   
    Farm management attributes                 
Moldboard tillage land percent  -1.430  0.005  ***  -1.280  0.022  **  -1.385  0.003  ***  -1.602  0.001  *** 
No till tillage land percent  0.083  0.848    0.020  0.965    -0.296  0.488    -0.372  0.299   
Conservation land percent  0.114  0.719    -0.491  0.150    -0.760  0.020  **  -0.247  0.468   
Wheat land percent  0.579  0.517    1.636  0.034  **  2.675  0.000  ***  2.111  0.003  *** 
Cover crops land percent  -1.065  0.015  **  -1.479  0.001  ***  -0.990  0.042  **  -0.032  0.942   
PSNT land percent  0.029  0.929    -0.293  0.401    0.324  0.339    -0.652  0.088  * 
Organic land percent  -1.751  0.007  ***  -1.612  0.117    0.164  0.753    -1.223  0.009  *** 
Irrigation land percent  0.158  0.743    0.096  0.810    -0.119  0.795    0.745  0.143   
Reduced Fertilizer use  0.095  0.689    0.366  0.094  *  0.265  0.135    0.547  0.016  ** 
Reduced Pesticide use  0.031  0.885    0.036  0.859    -0.046  0.803    -0.120  0.564   
MAEAP  -0.489  0.015  **  -0.169  0.594    -0.401  0.093  *  -0.258  0.288   
EQIP  0.269  0.211    0.104  0.551    -0.190  0.364    0.471  0.017  ** 
CRP  -0.142  0.432    -0.159  0.427    0.013  0.941    0.435  0.052  * 
CSP  -0.046  0.853    -0.101  0.653    0.073  0.775    -0.511  0.037  ** 
    Operator attributes                     
Age  -0.010  0.136    -0.002  0.752    -0.004  0.592    -0.010  0.140   
Education  -0.009  0.785    -0.005  0.873    0.048  0.137    0.055  0.060  * 
Constant  -1.579  0.101     -2.164  0.010  ***  -3.259  0.000  ***  -4.573  0.000  *** 
                          
N  886      871      865      896     
wald chi  101.07      90.7      103.13      140.95     
p(chi)  0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00     
R square  0.16      0.16      0.22      0.26     
Loglikelihood  -364.72        -405.10        -433.93        -432.63       
 






Table 7 Spatial probit results for enrollment decision in cropping system D by stratum, 1688 Michigan corn or soybean farmers, 2008 
   Small (1-99 acres)  Medium (100-499 acres)  Large (500-999 acres)  Very Large (over 1000 acres) 
  spatial  non-spatial  spatial  non-spatial  spatial  non-spatial  spatial  non-spatial 
   Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value  Coef  p-value 
Government  0.024  0.488  -0.159 0.739  -0.263 0.077*  -0.253 0.182  0.068  0.349  0.073  0.686  0.137  0.161  0.119  0.384 
Descending sequence  0.232  0.347  0.113  0.794  0.045  0.403  0.038  0.843  -0.172 0.170  -0.170 0.360  0.024  0.431  0.020  0.884 
Payment offer  0.036  0.003*** 0.027  0.045**  0.004  0.240  0.004  0.431  0.008  0.094*  0.008  0.173  0.018  0.000*** 0.017  0.000*** 
Perceived env. perf  2.060  0.000*** 1.608  0.001*** 0.725  0.000*** 0.698  0.000*** 0.421  0.000*** 0.401  0.002*** 0.503  0.000*** 0.477  0.000*** 
ES attitudes  0.461  0.017**  0.323  0.121  0.002  0.493  0.007  0.936  -0.056 0.265  -0.043 0.613  -0.038 0.262  -0.035 0.568 
Total land  0.003  0.343  0.003  0.735  -0.001 0.064*  -0.001 0.165  0.000  0.406  0.000  0.840  0.000  0.304  0.000  0.660 
Sandy soil  -0.094  0.453  -0.116 0.888  0.528  0.037**  0.494  0.096*  0.120  0.346  0.086  0.770  0.580  0.005*** 0.565  0.015** 
Clay soil  0.342  0.359  0.197  0.799  0.103  0.352  0.089  0.751  0.598  0.016**  0.549  0.041**  0.175  0.206  0.155  0.458 
Moldboard tillage  -4.172  0.002*** -3.080 0.033**  -0.888 0.046**  -0.819 0.115  -0.786 0.196  -0.656 0.439  0.614  0.326  0.708  0.551 
No till tillage  0.210  0.416  0.406  0.744  -0.578 0.117  -0.528 0.268  -0.273 0.284  -0.268 0.552  0.509  0.067*  0.505  0.157 
Conservation tillage  -1.365  0.058*  -0.852 0.281  -0.073 0.425  -0.019 0.960  0.002  0.498  0.047  0.909  0.322  0.157  0.311  0.340 
Wheat ratio  4.353  0.023**  3.222  0.077*  1.407  0.035**  1.347  0.099*  0.892  0.200  0.746  0.484  1.915  0.019**  1.816  0.039** 
Cover crops ratio  -0.675  0.298  -0.194 0.858  0.319  0.366  0.287  0.767  1.426  0.033**  1.400  0.081*  0.200  0.349  0.156  0.746 
PSNT ratio  /
a  /  /  /  -1.840 0.032**  -1.805 0.059*  0.669  0.091*  0.580  0.230  -0.310 0.195  -0.244 0.471 
Irrigation ratio  9.508  0.005*** 4.652  0.105  -0.533 0.225  -0.492 0.467  0.079  0.450  0.014  0.982  -0.933 0.008*** -0.989 0.012** 
Reduced fertilizer  0.281  0.331  0.300  0.622  0.747  0.004*** 0.723  0.009*** 0.060  0.405  0.067  0.755  -0.031 0.430  -0.027 0.865 
Reduced pesticide  0.641  0.153  0.387  0.491  0.406  0.062*  0.412  0.117  -0.394 0.075*  -0.375 0.154  0.189  0.128  0.193  0.239 
Program  0.196  0.255  0.237  0.421  0.210  0.033**  0.209  0.067*  0.311  0.000*** 0.304  0.001*** -0.084 0.095*  -0.089 0.180 
Age  -0.032  0.061*  -0.024 0.216  -0.017 0.007*** -0.016 0.042**  -0.017 0.046**  -0.015 0.104  0.002  0.371  0.002  0.824 
Education  0.172  0.011**  0.124  0.064*  -0.009 0.430  -0.009 0.809  0.030  0.225  0.021  0.598  0.027  0.208  0.028  0.350 
intercept  -12.095 0.000*** -9.339 0.001*** -1.928 0.039**  -1.972 0.060*  -2.179 0.035**  -2.107 0.077*  -3.680 0.000*** -3.543 0.000*** 
rho  0.152  0.001***     0.069  0.011**      0.219  0.000***     0.177  0.004***    
Number of obs      90     224     243     416 
LR chi2      42.78      53.99      43.19      79.98 
Prob > chi2         0.0014      0.0001      0.0019      0 
Pseudo R2         0.4098      0.1765      0.1344      0.1398 
Log-likelihood      -30.803084      -125.97544      -139.10126      -246.02784 
Note: ***significant at 99% level, **significant at 95% level, *significant at 90% level 
a. variable is dropped for convergence with limited observations. 
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Table 8 Spatial coefficient (rho) estimates by system and stratum for enrollment and consideration 
model, 1688 Michigan corn or soybean farmers, 2008 
 
consideration     enrollment 
  rho  p-level      rho  p-level 
system A        system A     
stratum 1  0.138  0.005***    stratum 1  0.091  0.010*** 
stratum 2  0.101  0.010***    stratum 2  0.129  0.003*** 
stratum 3  0.092  0.005***    stratum 3  0.142  0.003*** 
stratum 4  0.131  0.006***    stratum 4  0.134  0.001*** 
             
system B        system B     
stratum 1  0.098  0.006***    stratum 1  0.123  0.007*** 
stratum 2  0.135  0.005***    stratum 2  0.182  0.001*** 
stratum 3  0.056  0.017**    stratum 3  0.208  0.002*** 
stratum 4  0.089  0.006***    stratum 4  0.086  0.008*** 
             
system C        system C     
stratum 1  0.500  0.000***    stratum 1  0.134  0.003*** 
stratum 2  0.078  0.006***    stratum 2  0.064  0.013** 
stratum 3  0.099  0.009***    stratum 3  0.181  0.001*** 
stratum 4  0.112  0.008***    stratum 4  0.229  0.001*** 
             
system D        system D     
stratum 1  0.115  0.009***    stratum 1  0.152  0.001*** 
stratum 2  0.132  0.008***    stratum 2  0.069  0.011** 
stratum 3  0.077  0.010***    stratum 3  0.219  0.000*** 
stratum 4  0.125  0.004***     stratum 4  0.177  0.004*** 
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